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Abstract 
At the beginning of 2016, Italy remained one of the very few Eurozone 
countries without a national-level Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI), arguably a 
major lacuna in the armoury of the welfare state at a time of severe crisis and 
significant public spending cuts. Drawing on personal communications, parliamentary 
archives and secondary sources, an actor-centred approach emphasizing the role of 
domestic actors such as parties, trade unions and religious organizations is utilized to 
discuss the chronicle of the Italian GMI experience; especially the experimental 
national GMI in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.  
The experiment met with an early demise due to a meagre support base, in 
conjunction with the dominance of northern interests at the ministry responsible for 
the design and implementation of a scheme that mainly benefited the poorer south. A 
policy targeting ‘outsiders’ and introduced without broad consensus among key policy 
actors is unlikely to be durable. The recent economic crisis has revived the debate, as 
old and new policy actors express support for national-level GMI. 
 
Keywords: guaranteed minimum income; Italy; actor-centred approach  
 
Περίληψη 
Στις αρχές του 2016, η Ιταλία παρέμενε μία από τις ελάχιστες χώρες της 
Ευρωζώνης που δεν διέθετε ελάχιστο εγγυημένο εισόδημα σε εθνικό επίπεδο. Εν 
μέσω της κρίσης και των σημαντικών περικοπών στις δημόσιες δαπάνες, πρόκειται 
για μείζονα έλλειψη του ιταλικού κράτους προνοίας. Αξιοποιώντας την επικοινωνία 
με πρόσωπα που έπαιξαν καίριο ρόλο στην ιταλική εμπειρία με το ελάχιστο 
εγγυημένο εισόδημα, κοινοβουλευτικά αρχεία και δευτερεύουσες πηγές, το παρόν 
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άρθρο εξιστορεί την εν λόγω εμπειρία. Χρησιμοποιείται μία προσέγγιση που δίνει 
έμφαση στον ρόλο σημαντικών για τη διαμόρφωση κοινωνικής πολιτικής εγχώριων 
φορέων, όπως είναι τα πολιτικά κόμματα, τα εργατικά συνδικάτα και οι θρησκευτικές 
οργανώσεις. Η ανάλυση επικεντρώνεται ειδικότερα στον πειραματισμό με το 
ελάχιστο εγγυημένο εισόδημα σε εθνικό επίπεδο στην Ιταλία, στα τέλη της δεκαετίας 
1990 και τις αρχές της δεκαετίας 2000. 
Το πείραμα οδηγήθηκε σε ένα άδοξο τέλος. Η αιτία πρέπει να αναζητηθεί 
στην ισχνή υποστήριξη για το ελάχιστο εγγυημένο εισόδημα, σε συνδυασμό με την 
κυριαρχία υπέρ της βόρειας Ιταλίας συμφερόντων στο υπουργείο που ήταν υπεύθυνο 
για τον σχεδιασμό και την υλοποίηση ενός μέτρου που ευνοούσε κυρίως τον 
φτωχότερο νότο. Πολιτικές που στοχεύουν σε άτομα που βρίσκονται στα περιθώρια 
του κοινωνικού και πολιτικού συστήματος μπορούν να στεφθούν με επιτυχία μόνον 
υπό την προϋπόθεση ευρείας συναίνεσης. Η πρόσφατη οικονομική κρίση 
αναζωπύρωσε τη συζήτηση για το ελάχιστο εγγυημένο εισόδημα στην Ιταλία, με 
νέους και παλαιούς φορείς να εκδηλώνουν το ενδιαφέρον τους για μία εθνικής 
εμβέλειας εφαρμογή.   
 
Λέξεις κλειδί: ελάχιστο εγγυημένο εισόδημα, Ιταλία, προσέγγιση που εστιάζει στους 
κύριους διαμορφωτές κοινωνικής πολιτικής 
 
Introduction 
The Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) is an instrument of the ‘third 
generation’ of social assistance schemes. These are distinguished mainly by the 
combination of monetary allowances with social insertion measures (Kazepov, 
2011:106). Payments usually cover the difference between a household’s actual 
income and the resources it needs, according to a defined standard for living in a 
specific region or country. Recipients are required to participate in social insertion 
programmes meant to facilitate job-market integration, such as vocational training 
programmes (Matsaganis, 2013: 16, 21–22).  
EEC recommendations issued in 1992 advocated common criteria on 
sufficient resources and social assistance and convergence of social protection 
objectives and policies. Following this, the political and intellectual climate in most 
EEC member states turned toward the establishment of national-level GMI schemes. 
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At the beginning of 20161, Italy remained one of the very few Eurozone countries still 
lacking a permanent, national GMI. 
Italy launched a national GMI experimentally in 1998, only to abandon it a 
few years later. Other national, regional and local programmes against poverty have 
been developed, but do not substitute for a national GMI. A relatively delayed and 
unclear framework of social assistance decentralization has largely contributed to 
extremely uneven development and non-generalized adoption of these schemes by 
Italian regions and municipalities. Additionally, the sub-national schemes depend on 
resource availability and do not constitute individual enforceable rights (Lalioti, 2013: 
126, 133–135; Madama, Jessoula and Natili, 2014: 16–18, 25, 27).  
Notorious for high spending on old-age benefits2, the Italian welfare state is 
known for paying limited attention to ‘outsiders’. Aggregate spending on the two 
major social assistance benefits on the national level, the civil disability pension 
(pensione di invalidità civile) and the social pension (pensione sociale), persistently 
amounts only to about 3–4% of total social spending, according to the Bank of Italy. 
At the territorial level, data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics indicate 
standards and criteria for access to social assistance differ greatly among regions and 
municipalities (Lalioti, 2013: 59–61).  
This article draws on personal communications, parliamentary archives and 
secondary sources to record the story of the Italian GMI experience, especially the 
story of the experimental national GMI in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. In the 
absence of ‘functional equivalents’, above all of a coherent and inclusive social safety 
net of last resort, and given relatively high poverty3, the history of the GMI 
experiment is striking. An actor-centred approach is employed, focusing mainly on 
governmental actors, while also acknowledging the policy effects of actions (or 
inactions) by other key players, such as organized labour and religious organizations. 
From the viewpoint of political economy, GMI beneficiaries are outsiders with 
limited political representation, forced to rely on other actors to promote their 
interests (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 18).  
                                                          
1 At the time of writing.  
2 According to Eurostat data for 2011, spending on old-age and survivors in Italy equalled 57.06% of 
total public benefits, well above the EU-28 average of 43.8%.  
 
3 In 2015 the percentage of total population at risk of poverty in Italy equalled 19.9%. The EU-28 
average was 17.3%.   
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Policy actors’ attitudes towards GMI are here assumed to reflect the internal 
dynamics of given time periods and specific national contexts. Exogenous influences 
on domestic welfare agendas, such as from ‘soft-law’ instruments like European 
recommendations, are relatively mild. Innovations and changes in welfare policy do 
not follow deterministically, not even from extensive economic developments such as 
those linked to severe crises (Maino and Neri, 2012: 117). Influences, innovations and 
changes all depend on discretion, i.e. the interests and ideological preferences of 
domestic policy actors.  
This article aspires to contribute to studies on the Italian GMI experience such 
as those by Benassi and Mingione (2003), Ranci Ortigosa (2007a), Sacchi (2007), and 
Madama, Jessoula and Natili (2014). The following sections argue that the early 
demise of the experimental scheme in the early 2000s followed from a relatively weak 
support base for a national GMI, in conjunction with the dominance of northern 
interests at the ministry responsible for the design and implementation of a scheme 
that mainly benefited the poorer south. The crisis period since 2008 has seen a more 
intense debate, as national GMI has met support among old and new policy actors. 
The concluding section synthesizes the main lessons to be learned from the analysis.  
 
First steps towards a GMI 
The coming to power of the Prodi centre-left coalition in May 1996 raised 
hopes for policy changes that would integrate the weakest socio-economic strata and 
strengthen the country’s potential for a stable European future. The context was set 
partly by EEC initiatives calling for policy innovation, such as the 1992 
recommendations 92/441/EEC and 92/442/EEC, by a broad need to conform with 
EEC-imposed macroeconomic standards, and by Italy’s own deep political crisis. 
Changing the scenery in social assistance policy was a means of approaching these 
targets, also helping Prodi to raise his coalition’s profile as a modernizing 
government.  
Prodi in January 1997 appointed the expert Onofri Commission, tasked with 
assessing whether ambitious goals for welfare system reform were compatible with 
macroeconomic adjustments underway in preparation for European Monetary Union 
(personal communication with commission chair Paolo Onofri, 11 February 2012). 
The commission proposed a consistent reform strategy that would include 
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institutionalization of a national GMI4 (Commissione per l’analisi delle compatibilitá 
macroeconomiche della spesa sociale, 1997). The idea was advertised both as a means 
of facilitating labour market integration for outsiders (Carpo, 1997), and of reducing 
Italy’s high child poverty rates (personal communication with Livia Turco, minister in 
both Prodi governments, 15 March 2012).  
Despite the publicized benefits, the proposal of a permanent national GMI met 
with variant responses from political parties and labour confederations, from approval 
to scepticism to complete rejection. Members of the moderate centre and leftist parties 
in Prodi’s Olive Tree coalition, such as Alberta de Simone and Franco Chiusoli from 
the Democrats of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra, DS), welcomed the scheme as a 
significant contribution to the Italian welfare state (Camera dei Deputati, 1997b: 34, 
96, 129–130). Speaking for the centre-right Pole for Freedoms (Polo per le Libertà), 
Luca Danese argued that a GMI would be useless if it could not connect recipients 
with productive activities more obviously than in the centre-left’s proposal (Camera 
dei Deputati, 1997a: 34).  
The youth organizations of the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito 
Democratico della Sinistra, PDS) objected to the charitable aspect of the GMI, 
instead favouring policies to target job creation. These organizations went further, 
formulating a proposal underscoring the need for a stronger social insertion 
component than in the scheme proposed by the Onofri Commission (La Repubblica, 1 
February 1997). 
The most prominent opponent to GMI, however, was inside the Prodi 
government itself. Minister of Labour and former Christian Democrat Tiziano Treu 
compared offering GMI to the young to dispensing methadone (Lupoli, 1997). 
Likewise, the Communist Refoundation Party (Partito Rifondazione Comunista, 
PRC) rejected all Onofri Commission proposals as attempts to mask politically 
reactionary choices with the cold rationality of numbers (La Repubblica, 6 March 
1997). According to Vittore Luccio, a collaborator with the PRC’s general secretary 
(personal communication, 4 February 2013), his party also thought acceptance of the 
Onofri proposals would amount to a retreat from a full defence of workers’ rights. To 
finance GMI, the government intended to abolish the Redundancy Fund (Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni, CIG), which was considered symbolic as a protection of 
                                                          
4 The Commission integrated the GMI proposal of the 1995 Commission for Research on Poverty 
Issues. 
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workers’ rights in general. Replacing CIG with GMI was seen as leaving workers 
completely unprotected against layoffs. 
The unions were hostile or sceptical at best. Bruno Trentin, former leader of 
the General Confederation of Labour (Confederazione Generale del Lavoro, CGIL) 
and other prominent CGIL members issued explicit rejections. Likewise, the president 
of the Italian Confederation of Trade Unions (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati 
Lavoratori, CISL), Sergio D’Antoni, definitively opposed indiscriminate access to 
GMI-related measures for youth (La Repubblica, 1 February 1997). CISL General 
Secretary Raffaele Morese took a somewhat different position, commenting:  
The GMI being a social assistance scheme which does not promote job 
creation does not make it the best policy we (the unions) could imagine... 
an experimental phase will definitely help, however, in the sense of 
mitigating the risks of making the GMI permanent... we will see whether it 
helps beneficiaries get a job... instead of ending up as another sort of social 
assistance programme (Esposito, 1998, 6).  
 
Objections to GMI and defences of the existing welfare system were related to 
a general fear of restructuring, given that the national GMI proposal was linked to the 
gradual abolition of other social assistance categories. Labour confederations feared 
that a GMI might trigger an attack on unemployment benefits, be used as a minimum 
wage threshold, or replace active labour market policies. Insofar as GMI typically 
targets outsiders, it might mean a smaller pie for insiders (Lalioti, 2013: 103–104). 
Meanwhile Innocenzo Cipolletta, general director of the employers’ federation 
Confindustria, claimed the scheme would function as a disincentive against labour (Il 
Sole 24 Ore, 5 March 1997).  
The religious community displayed two clear trends. First, the church 
hierarchy took no public stance, following the non-alignment policy embraced by the 
Vatican through part of the 1990s, and feeling secure after their successful defence in 
1988 of the principle of subsidiarity and the resulting consolidation of Catholic 
religious organizations’ role in the social assistance field. This lack of involvement 
contrasts with areas where the church felt more threatened, for instance in family 
policy (Lalioti, 2013: 91, 93, 104; Chianura, 1999). Second, however, organizations 
like Caritas and the Christian Associations of Italian Workers (Associazioni Cristiane 
Lavoratori Italiani, ACLI) believed GMI aligned with their organizational principles, 
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seeing it as a significant step towards recognition of social citizenship for people at 
society’s margins. Caritas’ support did not translate into formal advocacy in public 
documents, however. Francesco Marsico, vice-director of Caritas Italiana (personal 
communication, 20 March 2012) attributes this to its identity as the pastoral 
organization of the Catholic Church. 
The initial national GMI debate was thus shaped by division in the 
government, scepticism or hostility from parties, interest groups and labour, and only 
‘unofficial’ support from Catholic grass-roots groups. Given this lack of a strong 
constituency, let alone a coalition in support, Prodi went ahead with a limited 
experiment as a way to demonstrate poverty was on the agenda, postponing actual 
financial and policy decisions until after the experiment. 
 
A ‘stillborn’ GMI experiment 
Law 449/1997 introduced an experimental GMI at the national level, called a 
‘Minimum Income for Integration’ (Reddito Minimo di Inserimento, RMI). Due to the 
socio-economic and other criteria used in selecting the 39 participating municipalities, 
the vast majority of beneficiaries (93%) were in the country’s south (IRS, Fondazione 
Zancan, and CLES, 2001; Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005: 112). The low cost (about 284 
million euros) left the government room to introduce additional social policy 
measures (La Repubblica, 13 June 1998).  
RMI recipients were defined as persons whose income did not exceed the 
1998 poverty line of 500,000 lire (258.23 euros) monthly for an individual living 
alone (Legislative Decree 237/1998, Article 6). The monetary allowance equalled the 
difference between the poverty line and actual income. The amount was set 
nationally, without consideration of regional differences in cost of living. 
Beneficiaries were also expected to participate in customized plans for social 
integration, such as training courses and care services to be devised locally (Sacchi, 
2006: 874–875). RMI provided territorial actors (local governments) with an 
opportunity to confront extreme poverty, assess the quality of services provided by 
local managers in the fight against poverty, and increase their popularity at low 
financial cost.  
While criticisms continued, inter alia proving the use of the term ‘experiment’ 
ambiguous (Lalioti, 2013, 107–108), the main official reason for the pilot RMI was to 
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identify operational difficulties territorial actors faced in providing benefits and 
managing insertion programmes, thereby testing in different contexts the scheme’s 
effectiveness in overcoming economic need and marginalization (Legislative Decree 
237/1998, Article 2). The plan was to evaluate the experiment, then decide whether to 
convert it into a permanent national programme at the end of 2000. By then the 
programme had 86,000 recipients. About 220 million euros were spent during the first 
two years (IRS, Fondazione Zancan, and CLES, 2001; Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005: 
117–118), less than one-thousandth of the Italian state’s overall social expenditure of 
282,617 million euros according to the Bank of Italy (Lalioti, 2013: 106). 
The next milestone for the RMI came with the passage of Law 388 (23 
December 2000) by the Amato government. Instead of making the RMI permanent, 
Article 80 extended it two years to 31 December 2002. The second experimental 
phase was to include 306 municipalities through territorial pacts with the 39 
municipalities of the first phase. Introduced by the government as new policies for 
local development, the pacts meant the majority of municipalities in this second phase 
were again in the south. The use of these networks to enact RMI was deemed a unique 
opportunity for institutional collaboration among territorial actors (Ministero della 
Solidarietà Sociale, 2007: 19, 122). 
Why did the Amato centre-left government decide on an extension instead of 
making the RMI permanent? The answer lies in the political situation at the time, with 
a political environment still resembling that during the launch of the first phase under 
the Prodi government. According to the scientific director and president emeritus of 
the Institute for Social Research, Emanuele Ranci Ortigosa (personal communication, 
25 January 2012), who was responsible for evaluating the Italian GMI experiment: 
Centre-left parties opted to prioritize alternative policies, particularly the 
integration of minimum pensions, rather than using the same resources for a 
reform that would introduce GMI… Labour confederations exerted similar 
pressures. They were reluctant to accept a dilution of the Italian welfare 
system’s contributory character, which secured for them a direct interventionist 
role in the system, for the sake of a more universalistic system.  
 
Italian media busily publicized the gap between the needs and capacities of 
territorial actors in the north as against the south (Magni and Sala, 2000; Sala, 2000; 
Arachi, 2002). This should be viewed within the broader fracture between north and 
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south, a long-standing historical phenomenon that widened during the first phase of 
industrial development in the early twentieth century (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 
1993; Fargion, 2005: 138).  
While the government could not easily ignore these factors and make the 
scheme permanent, it should also be recalled that the decision to extend the 
experiment came only months before the May 2001 general elections. Under pressure 
from southern territorial actors, some cadre of the centre-left coalition, mainly from 
the south and connected with Catholic third-sector organizations, supported the 
extension of RMI in their electoral districts (Lalioti, 2013: 110–111).  
This dissension reflected yet again how fragmentary the scheme’s support 
was. With the centre-left always divided and other key actors sceptical or hostile, it 
would prove impossible for the politically fragile initiative’s few ardent supporters to 
ensure its survival against future changes in government.  
It has furthermore been argued (Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005: 85; Sacchi, 2006: 
876) that termination of the GMI experiment was enabled by a 2001 constitutional 
reform depriving the central government of the power to issue planning instruments in 
the social assistance field (as Law 328/2000 had provided). After losing regional 
elections in 2000, Olive Tree adopted more devolution policy to compete with the 
Northern League (Lega Nord, LN) and undermine the centre-right (Bull and Pasquino, 
2007) in the 2001 national elections. In 2000, the Prodi coalition had still emphasized 
national standards for minimum service levels (the ‘essential levels for provisions’, 
Livelli Essenziali delle Prestazioni, Liveas) (La Repubblica, 1 June 2000). The 2001 
reform instead made implementation dependent on voluntary compliance from 
territorial actors. Since the central government had the authority only to define Liveas 
for the entire country, a national GMI could exist only if included in the Liveas 
(Sacchi, 2006: 876). 
Turco (personal communication, 15 March 2012) disagrees:  
The 2001 constitutional reform, specifically Article 117, did not 
expedite the RMI’s abolition. On the contrary, it transformed the 
RMI into a constitutional right, enabling the central government to 
guarantee a permanent national RMI through the establishment of 
the Liveas. If the law was never applied as it should have been, had 
the Liveas never been established nor the funding cut, is another 
story. 




The centre-left lost the election of 13 May 2001 to the centre-right ‘House of 
Freedoms’ (Casa delle Libertà, CdL) coalition. Although Berlusconi was the new 
government’s unquestioned leader, the Lega Nord, key to winning the election and 
maintaining the coalition, became a powerful veto player. The Lega was likewise 
pivotal in the abolition of RMI.  
 
The road to abolition 
In 2001 the centre-right returned to power for the first time since a nine-month 
period in 1994. At the same time, a trio of independent research centres (IRS, 
Fondazione Zancan and CLES, 2001) assessed the RMI’s first experimental phase. 
Cadre from Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and the Lega Nord soon showed their 
disapproval of RMI. Although Naples was among the municipalities that the 
programme had benefited most, it was denounced as pure welfare dependency by the 
FI provincial coordinator, Antonio Cuomo, and by the head of FI in the Naples 
regional council, Francesco Bianco (Fuccillo, 2004).  
Lega Nord, increasingly eurosceptic, was even more adamant in its opposition. 
During the election campaign its cadre, sounding like libertarians, claimed the free 
market offered effective protection to citizens and argued that public funds should be 
redirected from welfare benefits (‘state handouts’ that hindered economic 
development) to initiatives against unemployment (Greene, 2003:199). RMI reminded 
them of 1993, when protests broke out in northern Italy against a new minimum tax 
opponents believed would drain northern resources to support a dependent south 
(Gold, 2003: 94).  
Lega Nord had long accused southern Italy of developing ‘a welfare-
dependent culture addicted to the guarantees of the Italian bureaucracy’ (Bossi and 
Vimercati, 1993: 42), diverting federal resources that might otherwise have been 
invested in the private sector to foster growth. Welfare benefits for unworthy 
recipients in southern Italy would cause further deterioration of a country already 
operating at two speeds, ‘that of the producer... and that of the parasites’ (Bossi and 
Vimercati, 1993: 20). 
Thus it came as no surprise when the government downplayed evaluators’ 
positive remarks about the first RMI phase. The evaluators found that the scheme 
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mobilized territorial actors and encouraged inter-institutional cooperation and mutual 
learning within the public sector, as well as between the public and non-profit sectors 
(Saraceno, 2006: 105). In a similar vein, the 2001 National Action Plan for Social 
Inclusion, officially presented in June, referred to the experiment as one of the 
country’s best practical implementations of an anti-poverty programme (Ministero del 
Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2001: 58). 
The new government instead publicized and exaggerated the experiment’s 
negative aspects, painting an image of how well the developed, effective, productive 
north performed in comparison to the underdeveloped, ineffective and ‘idle’ south. 
The government stressed that the vast majority of RMI recipients lived in the south, 
where only a quarter participated in the scheme’s social inclusion programmes even 
two years after introduction; meanwhile, almost two-thirds of RMI beneficiaries in the 
north and a majority of those in central Italy were recorded as taking part in such 
programmes (Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005: 120).  
Having established this tactic of blaming the south, in July 2002 the 
government entered a so-called Pact for Italy (Patto per l’Italia) along with two of the 
country’s trade union associations, CISL and the Italian Labour Union (Unione 
Italiana del Lavoro, UIL). CGIL refused to sign, regarding the pact chiefly as another 
government attempt to avoid dealing directly with the major labour confederations. 
During this time the centre-right sought to distance itself from consultation 
(concertazione) and move to a sui generis social dialogue that required no agreement 
between government and other social actors (Pulignano, 2003: 6). 
Under the Pact for Italy (Point 2.7), the RMI experiment proved ‘the 
unfeasibility of legally identifying persons with the right to enter this social safety 
net’, so that it was necessary to create ‘a new instrument’ called the ‘Income of Last 
Resort’ (Reddito di Ultima Istanza, RUI; see Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche 
Sociali, 2002; Strati, 2009: 5). The government intended provisions modelled on GMI 
to exist only as voluntary, territorial programmes. Only the most financially powerful 
actors, concentrated in the north, were likely to possess resources for such schemes. 
Thus the positive evaluation reports and the 2001 National Action Plan for 
Social Inclusion came to naught. Lega Nord’s Roberto Maroni, minister of labour and 
social policy under Berlusconi, became chief architect of RUI as a replacement for 
national RMI. Maroni denounced RMI as a failure, blaming the south and stating in 
2002: ‘The objectives of the RMI were not accomplished… dangerous distortions 
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occurred, especially in the south, along with a return to practices that have nothing to 
do with combating irregular work, fighting social exclusion, or promoting 
reintegration into the labour market’. He further denounced existing safety net 
arrangements as ‘unfair and inefficient… children of the previous government’, which 
he described as ‘a prisoner of extreme views fostering a culture of dependency’.  
Maroni’s attitude conforms with Lega Nord’s ideological stance, in which 
solidarity is restricted towards northerners and directed against those considered to be 
strangers, i.e. southerners. The Lega’s priority was to represent northern interests. 
According to Ranci Ortigosa (personal communication, 25 January 2012), poverty is 
mainly present in the south, and the resources allocated for RMI were paid largely to 
southern municipalities. With political regionalism at its height, Lega Nord exploited 
growing discontent with the huge share of public expenditure fruitlessly earmarked 
for the south, calling RMI another example of the Italian state’s ‘southernization’, an 
imposition of deviant ‘southern’ practices as opposed to ‘northern’ ones (Bull, 1994: 
75).  
While Maroni made allegations, the government attacked RMI systematically. 
According to Chiara Saraceno (personal communication, 3 February 2011), former 
head of the Commission for Research on Poverty Issues and Social Exclusion and 
also an advisor to Livia Turco, the first Prodi government’s minister of social 
solidarity:  
…Part of the official documentation disappeared… not only by the minister’s 
decision but also the head of department who passed from one minister to the 
other, as well of functionaries who monitored the experiment (and most likely 
wanted to please the new minister). The Poverty Commission I chaired was 
congealed, offices closed, archives including those of the experiment dispersed. 
When I managed, threatening to go public, to de-freeze the Commission some 
months later, in order to complete the annual poverty report, even the computer 
files were no longer there.  
 
The political dominance of northern interests at the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy is also manifest in Fabrizio Spinnato’s words. Asked for the Lega’s 
position on RMI, Spinnato, in charge of social affairs at Lega Nord’s Padania office, 
pointed to public, government documents such as the Pact for Italy (Point 2.7) and the 
White Book on Welfare (pp. 37–38, on which more below) (personal communication, 
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18 January 2012). Nearly a year after the first RMI evaluation report appeared and 
despite continuing leaks to the media concerning the south’s problematic 
performance, the report had not publicized or discussed in parliament as the law 
required (Lalioti, 2013: 115).  
Thus the end was near, given a meagre support base for RMI, the anti-
southern Lega’s control of the relevant ministry, and the poorer south’s gains from the 
scheme.  
 
Alea iacta est; allegations and truths 
Law 289/2002 (27 December) allocated no further resources for RMI. The 
White Book on Welfare (February 2003) reiterated negative comments on the scheme 
(Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2003a: 37) and proposed introduction 
of RUI.  
Reference to problems in implementing the second RMI phase was again 
made in the second National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (July 2003), now 
drafted exclusively by the centre-right. These were attributed to the incapacity of 
territorial actors, i.e. local governments, to design and execute the scheme’s social 
inclusion component, as well as to the deficiencies of the Italian welfare system 
(Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2003b: 27–28). In September 2003, 
Maroni again asserted RMI was ‘an expensive and inefficient mechanism’ (La 
Repubblica, 19 September 2003).  
Putatively high costs and ineffectiveness became the centre-right’s official 
reasons for abolishing RMI. Yet neither was justified by the facts. Estimates for the 
annual cost of implementing national-level RMI ranged from two billion (Guerra and 
Toso, 2004: 2) to three billion euros (Sestito and Nigro, 2004). Even the latter 
represented just 0.23% of national GDP in 2003. The cost of civil disability pensions 
in the same year amounted to 10.5 billion euros, approximately 0.8% of Italy’s GDP 
(Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 2004). 
For many southern municipalities, the RMI experiment was the first 
experience of a modern income support founded on the concept of citizenship as a 
right rather than a privilege (as had been the norm). The admitted difficulties in 
managing demand for associated services in some cases triggered clientelism and 
fraud, but these were isolated incidents (Benassi and Mingione, 2003: 43). Local 
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variability in policy outcomes is, moreover, manifest even in systems believed 
superior to Italy’s, for instance in France (Mingione, Oberti and Pereirinha, 2002: 61–
77), without however being used as an excuse to abolish GMI.  
Finally, the experimental phase had been presented as a necessity for testing 
feasibility, locating weaknesses, and identifying corrective measures. The decision to 
cancel RMI precisely because of the expected unequal institutional performances 
among different territorial actors contradicts this. As Ranci Ortigosa (personal 
communication, 25 January 2012) asserts: 
The overall outcome was not discouraging. Especially the evaluation helped to 
articulate a clear set of guidelines for addressing the difficulties that arose 
within an appropriate time span. Thus, I do not think that there were any 
substantive reasons for the centre-left not to support the scheme or for the 
centre-right to abolish it. 
 
As supposed evidence of failure, the government and some journalists even 
pointed to the relatively high percentage of families exiting the RMI. They tended not 
to mention that this was because they had overcome the initial state of need (Sacchi, 
2006: 876). The second RMI evaluation report, this time conducted by four research 
centres, showed that the highest exit percentages were in municipalities exhibiting the 
lowest rates of unemployment, effectively arguing for the success of the RMI 
(Ministero della Solidarietà Sociale, 2007: 102 –104). 
For the vast majority of municipalities, RMI opened the way for rationalizing 
municipal services and integrating them into wider regional administrative schemes, 
also bringing about improvements in institutional and administrative capacities. Faced 
with zero or suspiciously low declared income, for example, several municipal 
governments assessed the living standards of RMI beneficiaries by visiting claimants’ 
homes to scrutinize their lifestyle, or requiring recipients to participate in a social 
integration programme at strategic times during the working day so as to prevent them 
from having another job in the informal economy (Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005: 121–
125).  
In short, the evidence does not support that high costs and/or ineffectiveness 
were the real reasons for the RMI’s abolition. A more credible explanation lies in 
domestic politics and the fragmented support or hostility of powerful constituencies 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 21:38:49 |
15 
 
and interest groups. This was reflected in the almost complete absence of protests 
against abolition.  
For example, reactions from the labour confederations were mixed. A few 
Catholic grassroots organizations that had been involved in RMI activation measures, 
including Caritas, did express opposition when the White Book was presented to 
social policy actors by Maroni and the secretary of social affairs, the Forza deputy 
Grazia Sestini, on 20 February 2003. That opposition never took the form of more 
overt protest, however (Lalioti, 2013: 120). 
The southern-dominated leadership of the National Association of Italian 
Communities (Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani, ANCI) was among the few 
representatives of territorial actors to organize a protest against abolition. The ANCI 
National Council was headed by the mayor of Foggia (Apulia) in southern Italy, Paolo 
Agostinacchio. He laid the blame for abolition on two members of Forza, Antonio 
Azzollini, chairman of the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on the Budget, and 
Alberto Zorzoli, the committee’s secretary (Petrini, 2002). 
As Ferrera (2003:635) put it, GMI schemes represent ‘a sphere of 
asymmetrical solidarity, in other words public support based purely on considerations 
of need, which presupposes strong ties of we-ness’. These ties were fatally lacking. 
 
Post-RMI debate about a national-level GMI  
Advertised by Maroni as an ‘alternative’ to the RMI ‘failure’ (despite the lack 
of a social inclusion component), the RUI scheme met with the same inglorious 
finale: it was never implemented. Under Law 350/2003 (Article 3) and the 2003–2005 
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion, the central government was required to co-
fund RUI in regions that decided to adopt it. RUI would cover up to 2.7% of Italian 
households with an average of 2,925 euros per household, while the funding needed 
was approximately 1.67 billion euros (Sestito, 2004: 3–4). 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, however, avoided having the 2003 
law state explicitly that RUI would be part of the Liveas that the government was 
supposed to ensure, or that it was exclusively regional (Strati, 2009: 5). Again, in the 
absence of these clarifications RUI paved the way for the central government to fund 
those territorial actors most able to implement the scheme, in other words, the 
wealthier, northern regions.  
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A final attack on RUI came in late 2004 from the judiciary. On a filing from 
several territorial actors who claimed the government’s initiative infringed upon their 
autonomy in social assistance policy, the Constitutional Court ruled that Rome had no 
authority to co-finance RUI schemes. The court claimed that the 2001 constitutional 
reform gave the government authority only to define Liveas (Sacchi, 2006: 876 –877). 
The ruling annulled the provision (Law 350/2003) allowing the central 
government to co-finance RUI schemes. The centre-right established no other fund to 
finance the measure, and the 2005 budget law (Law 311/2004) no longer made any 
reference to RUI. Furthermore, the only place that implemented RUI, the Rovigo 
municipality in the Veneto region, had made access contingent on the number of 
children in a family, the absence of a parent, the presence of elderly or disabled 
relatives, and so forth (Strati, 2009: 5). Many of those most in need were barred, 
raising further doubts whether RUI could ever have constituted a real alternative to 
RMI. 
That a large portion of policy actors had little interest in establishing social 
rights shared by all Italian citizens was again reflected in the 2005 constitutional 
reform, which further strengthened regional autonomy, providing a solid 
constitutional basis for both fragmentation and local federalism (Legislative Decree 
2544/2005). This worked against development of a national shared framework in the 
social assistance policy field, including GMI.  
During the second Prodi government, from April 2006 to May 2008, the 
economics and finance plan for 2007–2011 confirmed an intent to reconsider RMI. 
However, this would first require ‘evaluating the effectiveness of the measure in 
relation to the financial costs that its implementation might impose collectively’ 
(Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 2006: 140). 
Evidence from both the 1998 RMI experiment and more recent local 
experiences shows it would be relatively easy to design GMI so as to minimize fraud 
(Lalioti, 2013: 123). Moreover, scholars such as Monti and Pellizzari (2008) have 
indicated that a reasonably generous version of the scheme is financially viable. They 
estimated a total annual cost of 6.6 billion euros, about 0.5% of Italian GDP, to cover 
participation of 8% of Italian households. This calculation was based on a single-
person income threshold of 400 euros monthly. They contend viability would be 
guaranteed, especially if the monetary transfer’s nominal value was allowed to vary 
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according to differences in the cost of living around the country. Most GMI recipients 
did live in the south, where costs are typically lower than in the rest of the country.  
Hinting instead at the scheme’s putative (unknown and high) financial costs, 
the painstakingly worded 2006 plan for fiscal 2007–2011 subtly bespoke the centre-
left’s lack of will to re-introduce RMI. This document’s GMI talk put the poor back 
on the agenda symbolically, but the centre-left coalition still lacked a strong faction in 
support. 
According to Turco (personal communication, 15 March 2012), Paolo Ferrero, 
social solidarity minister under the 2006–2008 Prodi government and a PRC member, 
had a different vision of social policy. Under Ferrero’s direction the social policy 
agenda paid more attention to benefiting precarious workers, which Ferrero 
considered to be the solution to poverty (Lalioti, 2013: 124). Priority was also given 
to favouring pensioners; the government forged an agreement with labour unions to 
avoid a three-year increase in the retirement age, with a serious impact on the whole 
pension system (Madama, Jessoula and Natili, 2014: 12).  
The laws for fiscal year 2008 (222/2007 and 244/2007) allocated no funding 
for RMI and the government did not re-introduce the scheme. In his own defence, 
however, Ferrero points to the early fall of the second Prodi government as the sole 
reason for inaction on the RMI front (personal communication with Vittore Luccio, 31 
January 2012).  
In the immediate pre-crisis years the major labour confederations, especially 
CGIL, had adopted a theoretically more positive attitude towards a national GMI. 
According to Vera Lamonica, a CGIL national secretary (personal communication, 13 
February 2012), her confederation strongly favours GMI’s combination of income 
support with programmes for social inclusion and employment of those who are 
eligible. CGIL on 4 June 2007 held a conference on GMI in Rome, with participation 
also from CISL and UIL. On behalf of CGIL, Achille Passoni opened his presentation 
with the question, ‘Who is representing the poor?’ (Ranci Ortigosa, 2007b: 1).  
According to Eurostat data, the proportion of working poor in Italy increased 
from 8.8% in 2005 to 9.8% in 2007, a non-negligible rise of more than 10% in two 
years. This context arguably makes GMI a more attractive device for improving the 
income and living conditions of individuals who constituted the core of the union 
movement (Lalioti, 2013: 124–125).  
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The post-2008 crisis hit the Italian welfare state hard, causing severe cuts in 
health, social services and family policies and accelerated privatization of the pension 
system (Maino and Neri, 2012). Against this backdrop, despite Italian labour’s claims 
of support for GMI, ‘insiders’, such as members of trade unions, may be incentivized 
to revert to traditional priorities and defend the status quo. The slice of the pie for 
insiders is shrinking. Policy measures that benefit the so-called working poor and 
extreme outsiders (those who usually form the GMI clientele) put a further squeeze on 
resources for the vast majority of those represented by the trade unions. Despite 
appearances to the contrary, unions (many of whose members are pensioners) are not 
ready in practice to support a re-balancing of social expenditures so as to make room 
for GMI (see also Ciccarelli, 2013 on the ‘lavorismo’ of the Italian labour movement). 
All the same, the national GMI debate has revived. Social policy issues are 
increasingly salient for political party competition. GMI seems to have found support 
from both old and new policy actors. The old actors include Caritas. For instance, 
Caritas of Lombardy, with the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, 
prepared a study on ‘Independence Income’ (Reddito di Autonomia) (personal 
communications, Francesco Marsico, 20 March 2012; and Pierluigi Dovis, in charge 
of the regional commission of Caritas Turin, 2 March 2012; see also Caritas Italiana, 
2013: 38).  
Among the new proponents of GMI are members of the Democratic Party 
(Partito Democratico, PD), which arose in 2007 from a merger of various left-wing 
and centrist parties; prominent ministers of the Monti cabinet; the Basic Income 
Association of Italy (BIN-Italia), formed in 2008; Nichi Vendola’s Left, Ecology, 
Freedom (Sinistra Ecologia Libertà, SEL), founded in 2009; and Beppe Grillo’s Five 
Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S), likewise launched that year.  
The reasons behind these actors’ willingness to promote a GMI mechanism 
are different. For example, Elsa Fornero, minister of labour, social policy and gender 
equality in the Mario Monti cabinet of November 2011 to April 2013 envisioned GMI 
as part of structural reform in labour policy to target an increase in so-called 
‘flexicurity’ (Foschi, 2011). By contrast, BIN-Italia viewed a GMI as a first step 
towards the establishment and implementation of a Basic Income.  
 More recently, Matteo Renzi, who became secretary of the PD in December 
2013 and prime minister in February 2014, like his predecessors in the party and 
government, Bersani and Letta respectively, invoked the need for a guaranteed safety 
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net. Pier Carlo Padoan, Renzi’s economics minister, is one of the government 
ministers that has several times mentioned that GMI should be a consideration for the 
future. Furthermore, among other initiatives, in 2015–2016, the National Institute of 
Social Welfare (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, INPS) drafted a proposal 
for the reform of the pension system that included a GMI for those over the age of 55 
who were living in extreme poverty.  
Is Italy closer to the establishment of a GMI? The future months may show 
whether the country will remain one of the very few European countries lacking a 
national GMI. Interestingly, some argue that the chances for a national guaranteed 
safety net in Italy depend on the success of other anti-poverty policies (Madama, 
Jessoula, and Natili, 2014: 15–16). Nonetheless, whether Italy will see a national GMI 
apparently also rests on the interests and preferences of major policy actors who 
traditionally respond to the pleas of the most powerful constituencies and interest 
groups, often at the expense of outsiders. A redistributive reform to include outsiders 
is not considered necessary, even given the crisis (Maino and Neri, 2012). 
Endogenous dynamics appear, once again, to be more influential than external 
constraints. 
Onofri’s comment (personal communication, 11 February 2012), when asked 
why his commission promoted a ‘selective universalism’ instead of a more 
‘universalistic’ model of social assistance, highlights another dimension of these 
dynamics: beyond the importance of budgetary constraints, Italian public opinion 
generally does not give much value to citizenship rights. Provisions based solely on 
financial need are not widely accepted.  
According to a scientific survey of social media by the ‘Voices from the 
Blogs’ group at the State University of Milan, only 6.8% of individuals’ opinions 
sampled online urged the Letta government to implement income support for families 
in any form, including establishment of a GMI (La Repubblica, 14 May 2013). The 
leading request instead was for government intervention in the labour market, with 
23.2% of the sample in favour. A survey conducted by an Italian market research 
company5 in January 2014 likewise showed just 6% of the sample favouring 
introduction of a GMI as a national priority, as opposed to 46% who prioritize labour 
reform (see also Vis, van Kersbergen and Hylands, 2012: 8, 10).  
                                                          
5 The Milan-based Lorien Consulting S.R.L. 
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Old habits and interests are certainly too strong to die… 
 
Conclusions 
The twisted history of the RMI highlights a lack of political will within the 
centre-left, rejection from the centre-right, and the absence of a strong, coherent 
domestic coalition to promote establishment of a national GMI. The centre-left 
originally introduced the RMI but was divided about it. The centre-right was hostile, 
largely regarding GMI as benefiting the south at the expense of the north.  
Trade union confederations were unprepared to accept restructuring of the 
entire welfare system for the sake of a permanent national GMI. The ecclesiastical 
hierarchy, secure in their institutional role in the social assistance field and at that 
time loyal to a policy of non-alignment, adopted no public stance. Catholic grassroots 
organizations were among the few to support the scheme because it fit the citizenship 
model they envisioned. This did not translate into formal advocacy in the public 
record, however, due to these organizations’ ‘pastoral’ role. 
Given a meagre support base, RMI was extremely vulnerable to a change of 
government. With Lega Nord as Berlusconi’s indispensable ally at the time, RMI 
became a symbol for the danger the Italian state would be ‘southernized’, leading to 
the experimental scheme’s early demise.  
In more recent years, the impacts of the crisis, including increasing salience of 
social issues in elections, appear to have revived political parties’ interest in national 
GMI, in theory. To ‘old’ proponents of the scheme such as Caritas, one may now add 
new formations such as the PD (at least parts of it), SEL, Grillo’s M5S, or 
associations such as BIN-Italia. Against this backdrop, a recent proposal of reform of 
the pension system promises, inter alia, a GMI for people over the age of 55 who are 
living in extreme poverty. In a context characterized by the Italian public opinion’s 
preference for other policies, the future months may thus show whether a national 
GMI mechanism will be established in Italy; at a time when such a scheme is more 
needed than ever.  
 
Indicative bibliography 
Arachi, Al. 2002. “Controlli nelle case e ispettori in fabbrica. Così si può prevenire.” 
Corriere della Sera, June 9.  
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 21:38:49 |
21 
 
Benassi, D., and En. Mingione. 2003. “Testing the ‘Reddito Minimo di Inserimento’ 
in the Italian Welfare System.” In Minimum Income Schemes in Europe, 
edited by G. Standing, 105–156. Geneva: ILO. 
Bossi, Um. and D. Vimercati. 1993. La rivoluzione. La Lega: storie e idee. Milano: 
Sperling & Kupfer. 
Bull, An. 1994. “Regionalism in Italy.” In Regionalism in Europe. Regional 
Aspirations in the Europe of the 1990s, edited by P. Wagstaff, 68–83. Oxford: 
Intellect. 
Bull, M. and G. Pasquino. 2007. “A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in 
Italy.” West European Politics 30(4): 670 –691. 
Camera dei Deputati. 1997a. Discussione di legge finanziaria (A.C. 4355). December 
9.  
Camera dei Deputati. 1997b. Discussione di legge finanziaria (A.C. 4355). December 
10.  
Caritas Italiana. 2013. Rapporto 2012 sulla povertà e l’esclusione sociale in Italia. I 
Ripartenti. Povertà chroniche e inedite. Percorsi di risalita nella stagione della 
crisi. Roma: Caritas Italiana.  
Carpo, S. 1997. Proposal of Reform of the Welfare State. European Industrial 
Relations Observatory On–Line. March 28.  
Chianura, C. 1999. “Turco: Rispetto per il Papa ma no alle interferenze.” La 
Repubblica, November 1.  
Commissione per l’analisi delle compatibilità macroeconomiche della spesa sociale. 
1997. Relazione finale. Roma: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. 
Esposito, M.. 1998. “Arriva l’assegno di povertà – Sussidio di 500mila lire al mese.” 
La Repubblica, May 1.  
Fargion, V. 2005. From the Southern to the Northern Question: Territorial and Social 
Politics in Italy. In The Territorial Politics of Welfare, edited by N. McEwen 
and L. Moreno, 127–147. London: Routledge. 
Ferrera, M. 2003. “European Integration and National Social Citizenship.” 
Comparative Political Studies 36(6): 611–652. 
Foschi, P. 2011. “Il piano della Fornero: ‘Nuovo’ articolo 18 e reddito minimo.” 
Corriere della Sera, December 12.  
Fuccillo, R. 2004. “Povertà, aiuti agli immigrati.” La Repubblica, January 29. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 21:38:49 |
22 
 
Gold, Th. 2003. The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Greene, M. 2003. “Right-Wing Movements in the EU: A Case-Study of the Austrian 
Freedom Party and the Lega Nord.” In The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: 
A Reassessment, edited by G. Bischof, An. Pelinka, and Al. Lassner, 187–211. 
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.  
Guerra, M. C. and St. Toso. 2004. “Il nome non fa il reddito.” La Voce, May 6.  
Huber, Ev. and J. Stephens. 2001. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: 
Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
IRS, Fondazione Zancan, and CLES. 2001. Valutazione della sperimentazione 
dell’instituto del reddito minimo di inserimento: principali risultati e 
indicazioni di svillupo. Unpublished Manuscript.   
Kazepov, Y. 2011. “L’assistenza sociale in Italia nel confronto Europeo: Tra 
residualità, innovazione e un futuro incerto.” In Il Welfare in Italia, edited by 
Ug. Ascoli, 103–145. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Lalioti, V. 2013. Social Assistance Outcomes in Southern Europe: An Actor-Centred 
Approach. Doctoral Thesis, University of Oxford.  
Lupoli, An. 1997. “Treu contro il minimo vitale. Dato a tutti è metadone.” La 
Repubblica, March 2. 
Madama, Il., M. Jessoula, and M. Natili. 2014. “Minimum Income: The Italian 
Trajectory–One, No One and One Hundred Thousand Minimum Income 
Schemes.” Working Paper–LPF n. 1. Torino: Centro Einaudi.  
Magni, V. and Al. Sala. 2000. “Rapinata a ceffoni da una baby gang.” Corriere della 
Sera, March 21.  
Maino, Fr. and St. Neri. 2012. “Explaining Welfare Reforms in Italy between 
Economy and Politics: External Constraints and Endogenous Dynamics.” In 
The Times They Are Changing?: Crisis and the Welfare State, edited by B. 
Greve, 117–136. Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell.  
Maroni, R. 2002. “Maroni, niente assistenzialismo per la crisi dell’auto.” La 
Repubblica, October 16.  
Matsaganis, M. 2013. “The Guaranteed Minimum Income and its Role in Dealing 
with the New Social Issue.” In Guaranteed Minimum Income: Approaches 
and Proposals in View of the Pilot Implementation of the Scheme, edited by 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 21:38:49 |
23 
 
the National Institute of Labour and Human Resources, 10–27. Athens: 
National Institute of Labour and Human Resources [in Greek]. 
Mingione, En., M. Oberti, and J. Pereirinha. 2002. “Cities as Local Systems.” In 
Social Assistance Dynamics in Europe, edited by C. Saraceno, 35–79. Bristol: 
Policy Press. 
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze. 2004. Relazione generale sulla situazione 
economica del paese–2003. Roma: Instituto poligrafico e zecca dello stato.  
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze. 2006. Documento di programmazione 
economico–finanziaria. Roma: Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze.  
Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. 2001. Piano nazionale per l’ 
inclusione. Roma: Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche sociali.  
Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. 2002. Patto per l’Italia, Roma.  
Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. 2003a. Libro bianco sul welfare: 
Proposte per una società dinamica e solidale. Roma. 
Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. 2003b. Piano di azione nazionale 
contro la povertà e l’esclusione sociale 2003–2005, Roma.  
Ministero della Solidarietà Sociale. 2007. Relazione al Parlamento. Attuazione della 
sperimentazione del reddito minimo di inserimento e risultati conseguiti. 
Roma: Direzione generale per la gestione del fondo nazionale per le politiche 
sociali e monitoraggio della spesa sociale.  
Monti, P. and M. Pellizzari. 2008. “Implementing a Guaranteed Minimum Income in 
Italy: An Empirical Analysis of Costs and Political Feasibility.” Paper 
presented at ESPAnet-Italia, Ancona, November 6–8. 
Petrini, R. 2002. “Gli enti locali contro la manovra. A rischio i servizi ai cittadini.” La 
Repubblica, December 5.  
Pulignano, V. 2003. “Union Struggle and the Crisis of Industrial Relations in Italy.” 
Capital & Class 79: 1–7. 
Putnam, R., R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Ranci Ortigosa, Em. 2007a. “La riforma del welfare. Dieci anni dopo la Commissione 
Onofri. Il reddito minimo di inserimento.” ASTRID-Fondazione Ermanno 
Gorrieri-IRS, pp. 1–16. 
Ranci Ortigosa, Em. 2007b. “I poveri, chi li rappresenta?.” Prospettive Sociali e 
Sanitarie 12: 1–2. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 21:38:49 |
24 
 
Sacchi, St. 2006. “Che fine ha fatto il reddito minimo di inserimento?.” Il Mulino 5: 
870–880.   
Sacchi, St. 2007. “L’esperienza del reddito minimo di inserimento.” In Povertà e 
benessere. Una geographia delle disuguaglianze in Italia, edited by An. 
Brandolini and Ch. Saraceno, 423–448. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Sacchi, St. and Fr. Bastagli 2005. “Italy-Striving Uphill But Stopping Halfway. The 
Troubled Journey of the Experimental Minimum Insertion Income.” In 
Welfare State Reform in Southern Europe. Fighting Poverty and Social 
Exclusion in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, edited by M. Ferrera, 84–140. 
London: Routledge/EUI Studies in the Political Economy of Welfare. 
Sala, Al. 2000. “Orfani dell’industria a rischio povertà.” Corriere della Sera, March 
1.     
Sestito, P. 2004. “Se il reddito è di ultima istanza.” La Voce, May 6.  
Sestito, P. and V. Nigro. 2004. “La sensibilità alle regole di accesso della spesa 
Aggregata e della Composizione dei beneficiari nel sostegno al reddito di ultima 
istanza: alcune valutazioni.” Mimeo.  
Strati, F. 2009. Italy. Minimum Income Schemes. A Study of National Policies (on 
behalf of the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities). Brussels.   
Vis, B., K. van Kersbergen, and Th. Hylands. 2012. “To What Extent Did the 
Financial Crisis Intensify the Pressure to Reform the Welfare State?.” In  The 
Times They Are Changing?: Crisis and the Welfare State, edited by B. Greve, 
7–22. Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell. 
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 21:38:49 |
